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Abstract—Cooperative spectrum sensing, despite its effective-
ness in enabling dynamic spectrum access, suffers from location
privacy threats, merely because secondary users (SU s)’ sensing
reports that need to be shared with a fusion center to make
spectrum availability decisions are highly correlated to the users’
locations. It is therefore important that cooperative spectrum
sensing schemes be empowered with privacy preserving capabil-
ities so as to provide SU s with incentives for participating in
the sensing task. In this paper, we propose an efficient privacy
preserving protocol that uses an additional architectural entity
and makes use of various cryptographic mechanisms to preserve
the location privacy of SU s while performing reliable and
efficient spectrum sensing. We show that not only is our proposed
scheme secure and more efficient than existing alternatives, but
also achieves fault tolerance and is robust against sporadic
network topological changes.
Index Terms—Location privacy, secure cooperative spectrum
sensing, order preserving encryption, cognitive radio networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative spectrum sensing is a key component of cog-
nitive radio networks (CRN s) essential for enabling dynamic
and opportunistic spectrum access [1]. It consists of having
secondary users (SU s) sense the licensed channels on a regular
basis and collaboratively decide whether a channel is available
prior to using it so as to avoid harming primary users (PU s).
One of the most popular spectrum sensing techniques is energy
detection, thanks to its simplicity and ease of implementation,
which essentially detects the presence of PU signal by mea-
suring and relying on the energy strength of the sensed signal,
commonly known as the received signal strength (RSS ) [2].
Broadly speaking, cooperative spectrum sensing techniques
can be classified into two categories: Centralized and dis-
tributed [1]. In centralized techniques, a central entity called
fusion center (FC ) orchestrates the sensing operations as
follows. It selects one channel for sensing and, through a
control channel, requests that each SU perform local sensing
on that channel and send its sensing report (e.g., the observed
RSS value) back it to. It then combines the received sensing
reports, makes a decision about the channel availability, and
diffuses the decision back to the SU s. In distributed sensing
techniques, SU s do not rely on a FC for making channel
availability decisions. They instead exchange sensing infor-
mation among one another to come to a unified decision [1].
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This requirement makes distributed sensing techniques highly
complex with respect to their centralized counterparts. Hence,
centralized sensing techniques are considered more practical
for real-life applications.
Despite its usefulness and effectiveness in promoting dy-
namic spectrum access, cooperative spectrum sensing suffers
from serious security and privacy threats. One big threat to
SU s, which we tackle in this work, is location privacy, which
can easily be leaked due to the wireless nature of the signals
communicated by SU s during the cooperative sensing process.
In fact, it has been shown that RSS values of SU s are highly
correlated to their physical locations [3], thus making it easy
to compromise the location privacy of SU s when sending
out their sensing reports. The fine-grained location, when
combined with other publicly available information, could
easily be exploited to infer private information about users [4].
Examples of such private information are shopping patterns,
user preferences, and user beliefs, just to name a few [4].
With such privacy threats and concerns, SU s may refuse to
participate in the cooperative sensing tasks. It is therefore
imperative that cooperative sensing schemes be enabled with
privacy preserving capabilities that protect the location privacy
of SU s, thereby encouraging them to participate in such a key
CRN function, the spectrum sensing.
In this paper, we propose an efficient privacy-preserving
scheme for cooperative spectrum sensing that exploits various
cryptographic mechanisms to preserve the location privacy of
SU s while performing the cooperative sensing task reliably
and efficiently. We show that our proposed scheme is secure
and more efficient than its existing counterparts, and is robust
against sporadic topological changes and network dynamism.
A. Related Work
Security and privacy in CRN s have gained some attention
recently. Yan et al. [5] discussed security issues in fully
distributed cooperative sensing. Qin et al. [6] proposed a
privacy-preserving protocol for CRN transactions using a
commitment scheme and zero-knowledge proof.
Location privacy, though well studied in the context of
location-based services (LBS) [7], [8], has received little atten-
tion in the context of CRN s [3], [9], [10]. Some works focused
on location privacy but not in the context of cooperative
spectrum sensing (e.g., database-driven spectrum sensing [9],
[11] and dynamic spectrum auction [10]) and are skipped since
they are not within this paper’s scope.
In the context of cooperative spectrum sensing, Shuai et
al. [3] showed that SU s’ locations can easily be inferred
from their RSS reports, and called this the SRLP (single
report location privacy) attack. They also identified the DLP
(differential location privacy) attack, where a malicious entity
can estimate the RSS (and hence the location) of a leav-
ing/joining user from the variations in the final aggregated
RSS measurements before and after user’s joining/leaving of
the network. They finally proposed PPSS , a protocol for
cooperative spectrum sensing, to address these two attacks.
Despite its merits, PPSS has several limitations: (i) It needs
to collect all the sensing reports to decode the aggregated
result. This is not fault tolerant, since some reports may be
missing due, for e.g., to the unreliable nature of wireless
channels. (ii) It cannot handle dynamism if multiple users join
or leave the network simultaneously. (iii) The pairwise secret
sharing requirement incurs extra communication overhead and
delay. (iv) The underlying encryption scheme requires solving
the Discrete Logarithm Problem [12], which is possible only
for very small plaintext space and can be extremely costly
(see Table I). Chen et al. [13] proposed PDAFT , a fault-
tolerant and privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme for
smart grid communications. PDAFT , though proposed in the
context of smart grids, is suitable for cooperative sensing
schemes. But unlike PPSS , PDAFT relies on an additional
semi-trusted entity, called gateway, and like other aggregation
based methods, is prone to the DLP attack. In our previous
work [14] we proposed an efficient scheme called LPOS to
overcome the limitations that existent approaches suffer from.
LPOS combines order preserving encryption and yao’s mil-
lionaire protocol to provide a high location privacy while
enabling an efficient sensing performance.
B. Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose a new location privacy-preserving
scheme that we call LP-3PSS (location privacy for 3-party
spectrum sensing architecture), which harnesses various cryp-
tographic primitives (e.g., order preserving encryption) in
innovative ways along with an additional architectural entity
(i.e., a gateway) to achieve high location privacy with a low
overhead. That is, our proposed LP-3PSS scheme offers the
following desirable properties:
• Location privacy of secondary users while performing the
cooperative spectrum sensing effectively and reliably.
• Fault tolerance and robustness against network dynamism
(e.g., multiple SU s join/leave the network) and failures
(e.g., missed sensing reports).
• Reliability and resiliency against malicious users via an
efficient reputation mechanism.
• Accurate spectrum availability decisions via half-voting
rules while incurring minimum communication and com-
putation overhead.
Note that for simplicity we use energy detection through
RSS measurement for spectrum sensing in our scheme. How-
ever, our scheme can be applied with any other spectrum de-
tection technique whose sensing reports may leak information
about the location of the users.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We consider a cooperative spectrum sensing architecture
that consists of a FC and a set of SU s, where each SU is
assumed to be capable of measuring RSS on any channel by
means of an energy detection method [2]. In this cooperative
sensing architecture, the FC combines the sensing observa-
tions collected from the SU s, decides about the spectrum
availability, and broadcasts the decision back to the SU s
through a control channel. This could typically be done via
either hard or soft decision rules. The most common soft de-
cision rule is aggregation, where FC collects the RSS values
from the SU s and compares their average to a predefined
threshold, τ , to decide on the channel availability.
In hard decision rules, e.g. voting, FC combines votes
instead of RSS values. Here, each SU compares its RSS value
with τ , makes a local decision (available or not), and then
sends to the FC its one-bit local decision/vote instead of
sending its RSS value. FC applies then a voting rule on
the collected votes to make a channel availability decision.
However, for security reasons to be discussed shortly, it may
not be desirable to share τ with SU s. In this case, FC can
instead collect the RSS values from the SU s, make a vote
for each SU separately, and then combine all votes to decide
about the availability of the channel.
In this work, we opted for the voting-based decision rule,
with τ is not to be shared with the SU s, over the aggregation-
based rule. There are two reasons for choosing voting-based
decision rule over the aggregation-based decision rule: (i)
Aggregation methods are more prone to sensing errors; for
example, receiving some erroneous measurements that are far
off from the average of the RSS values can skew the computed
RSS average, thus leading to wrong decision. (ii) Voting does
not expose users to the DLP attack [3] (which is identified
earlier in Section I-A). We chose not to share τ with the SU s
because doing so limits the action scope of malicious users
that may want to report falsified RSS values for malicious
and/or selfish purposes.
In this paper we investigate a 3-party cooperative sensing
architecture, where a third entity, called gateway (GW ), is
incorporated along with the FC and SU s to cooperate with
them in performing the sensing task. As will be shown later,
this additional gateway allows to achieve higher privacy and
lesser computational overhead, but of course at its cost.
A. Security Threat Model and Objectives
We consider a semi-honest threat model, where all the
network parties (i.e., SU s, FC , and GW ) are assumed to be
honest but curious in that they execute the protocol honestly
but show interest in learning information about the other
parties. This means that none of these entities is trusted. More
specifically, we make the following assumptions:
Security Assumption 1. No party in the system modifies
maliciously (or nonmaliciously) the integrity of its input. That
is, (i) FC does not maliciously inject false τ ; and (ii) the SU s
do not maliciously change their RSS values.
Security Assumption 2. No party in the system colludes with
any of the other parties. That is, (i) FC does not collude
with SU s; (ii) SU s do not collude with one another; and (iii)
GW does not collude with SU s or FC .
As mentioned before, RSS values are shown to be highly
correlated to the SU s’ locations [3]. Therefore, if the confi-
dentiality of the RSS values is not protected, then nor is the
location privacy of the SU s. With this in mind, the security
objectives of the proposed schemes are then:
Security Objective 1. Keep the RSS value of each SU confi-
dential to the SU only by hiding it from all other parties. This
should hold during all sensing periods and for any network
membership change.
Also, since SU s may rely on the threshold τ to maliciously
manipulate their RSSs, our second objective is then to:
Security Objective 2. Keep τ confidential to the FC only by
hiding it from all other parties. This should hold during all
sensing periods and for any network membership change.
B. Half-Voting Availability Decision Rule
Our proposed scheme uses the half-voting decision rule,
shown to be optimal in [15], and for completeness, we here
highlight its main idea. Details can be found in [15].
Let h0 and h1 be the spectrum sensing hypothesis that
PU is absent and present, respectively. Let Pf , Pd and Pm
denote the probabilities of false alarm, detection, and missed
detection, respectively, of one SU ; i.e., Pf = Pr(RSS > τ |
h0), Pd = Pr(RSS > τ | h1), and Pm = 1−Pd. FC collects
the 1-bit decisionD i from each SU Ui and fuses them together
according to the following fusion rule [15]:
dec =


H1,
n∑
i=1
D i ≥ λ
H0,
n∑
i=1
D i < λ
(1)
Note that FC infers that PU is present when at least λ SU s
are inferring h1. Otherwise, FC decides that PU is absent,
i.e. H0. Note here that the OR fusion rule corresponds to
the case where λ = 1 and the AND fusion rule corresponds
to the case where λ = n . The cooperative spectrum sensing
false alarm probability, Qf , and missed detection probability,
Qm, are: Qf = Pr(H1 | h0) and Qm = Pr(H0 | h1).
Letting n be the number of SU s, the optimal value of λ that
minimizes Qf + Qm is λopt = min(n, ⌈n/(1 + α)⌉), where
α = ln(
Pf
1−Pm
)/ ln( Pm
1−Pf
) and ⌈·⌉ denotes the ceiling function.
For simplicity, λopt is denoted as λ throughout this paper.
C. Reputation Mechanism
To make the voting rule more reliable, we incorporate a
reputation mechanism that allows FC to progressively elim-
inate faulty and malicious SU s. It does so by updating and
maintaining a reputation score for each SU to reflect the level
of reliability the SU has. Our proposed schemes incorporate
the Beta Reputation mechanism, proposed and shown to be
robust by Arshad et al. [16]. For completeness, we highlight
its key features next; more details can be found in [16].
At the end of each sensing period t, FC obtains a decision
vector, b(t) = [b1(t), b2(t), . . . , bn(t)]
T with bi(t) ∈ {0, 1},
where bi(t) = 0 (resp. bi(t) = 1) means that the spectrum is
reported to be free (resp. busy) by SU Ui. FC then makes a
global decision using the fusion rule f as follows:
dec(t) = f(w(t), b(t)) =

1 if
n∑
i=1
wi(t)bi(t) ≥ λ
0 otherwise
(2)
where w(t) = [w1(t), w2(t) . . . , wn(t)]
T is the weight vector
calculated by FC based on the credibility score of each user, as
will be shown shortly, and λ is the voting threshold determined
by the Half-voting rule [15], as presented in Section II-B.
For each SU Ui, FC maintains positive and negative rating
coefficients, ̺i(t) and ηi(t), that are updated every sensing
period t as: ̺i(t) = ̺i(t− 1)+ ν1(t) and ηi(t) = ηi(t− 1)+
ν2(t), where ν1(t) and ν2(t) are calculated as
ν1(t) =
{
1 bi(t) = dec(t)
0 otherwise
ν2(t) =
{
1 bi(t) 6= dec(t)
0 otherwise
Here, ̺i(t) (resp. ηi(t)) reflects the number of times Ui’s
observation, bi(t), agrees (resp. disagrees) with the FC ’s
global decision, dec(t).
FC computes then Ui’s credibility score, ϕi(t), and contri-
bution weight, wi(t), at sensing period t as:
ϕi(t)=
̺i(t) + 1
̺i(t)+ηi(t)+2
(3)
wi(t)=ϕi(t)/
n∑
j=1
ϕj(t) (4)
D. Cryptographic Building Blocks
Our scheme uses a well known cryptographic building
block, which we define next before using it in the next section
when describing our scheme so as to ease the presentation.
Definition 1. Order Preserving Encryption (OPE): is a
deterministic symmetric encryption scheme whose encryption
preserves the numerical ordering of the plaintexts, i.e. for
any two messages m1 and m2 s.t. m1 ≤ m2, we have
c1 ← OPE .EK(m1) ≤ c2 ← OPE .EK(m2) [17], with
c← OPE .EK(m) is order preserving encryption of a message
m ∈ {0, 1}d under key K , where d is the block size of OPE .
Note that communications are made over a secure (authen-
ticated) channel maintained with a symmetric key (e.g., via
SSL/TLS as in Algorithm 1) to ensure confidentiality and
authentication. For the sake of brevity, we will only write
encryptions but not the authentication tags (e.g., Message
Authentication Codes [18]) for the rest of the paper.
III. LP-3PSS
We now present our proposed scheme that we call LP-
3PSS (location privacy for 3-party spectrum sensing architec-
ture), which offers high location privacy and low overhead, and
uses an additional entity in the network, referred to as Gateway
(GW ) (thus ”3P” refers to the 3 parties: SU s, FC , and GW ).
GW enables a higher privacy by preventing FC from even
learning the order of encrypted RSS values of SU s which was
allowed in LPOS [14]. GW also learns nothing but secure
comparison outcome of RSS values and τ , as in YM but
only using OPE . Thus, no entity learns any information on
RSS or τ beyond a pairwise secure comparison, which is the
minimum information required for a voting-based decision.
• Intuition: The main idea behind LP-3PSS is simple yet
very powerful: We enable GW to privately compare n dis-
tinct OPE encryptions of τ and RSS values, which were
computed under n pairwise keys established between FC and
SU s. These OPE encrypted pairs permit GW to learn the
comparison outcomes without deducing any other information.
GW then sends these comparison results to FC to make the
final decision. FC learns no information on RSS values and
SU s cannot obtain the value of τ , which complies with our
Security Objectives 1 and 2. Note that LP-3PSS relies only
on symmetric cryptography to guarantee the location privacy
of SU s. Hence, it is the most computationally efficient and
compact scheme among all alternatives (see Section V), but
with an additional entity in the system.
LP-3PSS is described in Algorithm 1 and outlined below.
• Initialization: Let (E ,D) be IND-CPA secure [18] block
cipher (e.g. AES ) encryption/decryption operations. FC es-
tablishes a secret key with each SU and GW . GW establishes
a secret key with each SU . FC encrypts τ with OPE using
kFC ,i, i = 1 . . .n . FC then encrypts OPE ciphertexts with
E using kFC ,GW and sends these cis to GW , i = 1 . . .n .
Since these encryptions are done offline at the beginning of the
protocol, they do not impact the online private sensing phase.
FC may also pre-compute a few extra encrypted values in the
case of new users joining the sensing.
• Private Sensing: Each U i encryptsRSS i with OPE using
kFC ,i, which was used by FC to OPE encrypt τ value.
U i then encrypts this ciphertext with E using key kGW ,i,
and sends the final ciphertext ςi to GW . GW decrypts 2n
ciphertexts cis and ςis with D using kFC ,GW and kGW ,i,
which yields OPE encrypted values. GW then compares each
OPE encryption of RSS with its corresponding OPE en-
cryption of τ . Since both were encrypted with the same key,
GW can compare them and conclude which one is greater
as in Step 7. GW stores the outcome of each comparison
in a binary vector b , encrpyts and sends it to FC . Finally,
FC compares the summation of votes v to the optimal
voting threshold λ to make the final decision about spectrum
availability and updates the reputation scores of the users.
• Update after G Membership Changes or Breakdown: Each
new user joining the sensing just establishes a pairwise secret
key with FC and GW . This has no impact on existing users.
If some users leave the network, FC and GW remove their
secret keys, which also has no impact on existing users. In
both cases, and also in the case of a breakdown or failure,
λ must be updated accordingly.
Algorithm 1 LP-3PSS Algorithm
Initialization: Executed only once.
1: FC sets energy sensing, optimal voting thresholds τ , λ,
and weights vector w ← 1, respectively.
2: Entities establish private pairwise keys and maintain au-
thenticated secure channels (e.g., via SSL/TLS) as follows:
• kFC ,i between FC and each user U i, i = 1, . . . , n .
• kGW ,i between GW and each user U i, i = 1, . . . , n .
• kFC ,GW between FC and GW .
3: FC computes ci ← EkFC,GW (OPE .EkFC,i(τ)), i =
1, . . . , n and sends {ci}
n
i=1 to GW .
Private Sensing: Executed every sensing period tw
4: U i computes ςi ← EkGW ,i(OPE .EkFC,i(RSS i)), i =
1, . . . , n and sends {ςi}
n
i=1 to GW .
5: GW obtains OPE .EkFC,i(τ) ← DkFC,GW (ci) and
OPE .EkFC,i(RSS i)← DkGW ,i(ςi), i = 1, . . . , n .
6: for i = 1, . . . , n do
7: if OPE .EkFC,i(RSS i) < OPE .EkFC,i(τ) then bi ← 0
8: else bi ← 1
9: GW computes ζ ← EkFC,GW ({bi}
n
i=1) and sends ζ to FC .
10: FC decrypts ζ and computes v ←
n∑
i=1
wi × bi
11: if v ≥ λ then dec ← Channel busy
12: else dec ← Channel free
13: FC updates the credibility score ϕi and weight wi of each
user Ui as in equations 3 and 4 for i = 1, . . . , n
return dec
Update after G Membership Changes or Breakdown:
14: If a user joins the network, it needs to establish a pairwise
secret key with FC and GW . If SU (s) join/leave or
breakdown, λ is updated as λ’.
15: Follow the private sensing steps with new λ’.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We first describe the underlying security primitives, on
which our schemes rely, and then precisely quantify the in-
formation leakage of our schemes, which we prove to achieve
our Security Objectives 1 and 2.
Fact 1. An OPE is indistinguishable under ordered chosen-
plaintext attack (IND-OCPA) [17] if it has no leakage, except
the order of ciphertexts (e.g. [20], [21]).
Let E and OPE .E be IND-CPA secure [18] and IND-OCPA
secure symmetric ciphers, respectively. ({RSS ji}
n,l
i=1,j=1, τ)
are RSS values and τ of each U i and FC for sensing periods
j = 1, . . . , l in a group G. (L1,L2,L3) are history lists,
which include all values learned by entities U i, FC and
GW , respectively, during the execution of the protocol for
all sensing periods and membership status of G. Vector ~V is
a list of IND-CPA secure values transmitted over secure
(authenticated) channels. ~V may be publicly observed by all
entities including external attacker A. Hence, ~V is a part of all
TABLE I: Computational overhead comparison
Scheme
Computation
FC SU GW
LP-3PSS D + β · (E +OPEE) OPEE + E n · D + E
LPOS 1/2 · (2 + log n) · γ · |p| ·Mulp (2γ · |p|+ 2γ) ·Mulp+OPE + 2µ · log n · PMulQ -
PPSS H + (n + 2) ·Mulp+ (2γ−1 · n + 2) ·Expp H + 2Expp+Mulp -
PDAFT 2ExpN 2 + InvN 2 + y ·MulN 2 2ExpN 2 +MulN 2 n ·MulN 2
(i) Variables: κ security parameter, N : modulus in Paillier, p: modulus of El Gamal, H: cryptographic hash operation, K: secret group key of OPE . Expu and Mulu denote
a modular exponentiation and a modular multiplication over modulus u respectively, where u ∈ {N ,N 2, p}. InvN 2: modular inversion over N 2, PMulQ: point
multiplication of order Q, PAddQ: point addition of order Q. y: number of servers needed for decryption in PDAFT . (ii) Parameters size: For a security parameter κ = 80,
suggested parameter sizes by NIST 2012 are given by : |N | = 1024, |p| = 1024, |Q| = 192 as indicated in [19]. (iii) OPE: we rely on OPE scheme proposed by
Boldyreva [17] for our evaluation because of its popularity and public implementation but our schemes can use any secure OPE scheme (e.g., [17], [20], [21]) as a building
block. (v) E : We rely on AES [22]2 as our (E ,D) for our cost analysis.
lists (L1,L2,L3). Values (jointly) generated by an entity such
as cryptographic keys or variables stored only by the entity
itself (e.g., λ, π) are not included in history lists for brevity.
Theorem 1. Under Security Assumptions 1 and 2, LP-
3PSS leaks no information on ({RSS ji}
n,l
i=1,j=1, τ) beyond
IND-CPA secure {~V j}lj=1, IND-OCPA secure pairwise order
{OPE .EkFC,i(RSS
j
i ), OPE .EkFC,i(τ)}
n,l
i=1,j=1 to GW and
{bji}
n,l
i=1,j=1 to FC .
Proof: ~V j = {cji , ς
j
i , ζ
j}n,li=1,j=1, where {c
j
i}
n,l
i=1,j=1 and
{ςji , ζ
j}n,li=1,j=1 are generated at the initialization and privacy
sensing in Algorithm 1, respectively. History lists are as
follows for each sensing period j = 1, . . . , l:
L1 = ~V
j , L2 = ({b
j
i}
n,l
i=1,j=1,
~V j),
L3 = ({OPE .EkFC,i(RSS
j
i ),OPE .EkFC,i(τ)}
n,l
i=1,j=1,
~V j ,
{bji}
n,l
i=1,j=1)
Variables in (L1,L2,L3) are IND-CPA secure and IND-OCPA
secure, and therefore leak no information beyond the pairwise
order of ciphertexts to GW by Fact 1.
Any membership status update on G requires an authenti-
cated channel establishment or removal for joining or leaving
members, whose private keys are independent from each other.
Hence, history lists (L1,L2,L3) are computed identically as
described above for the new membership status of G, which
are IND-CPA secure and IND-OCPA secure. 
Corollary 1. Theorem 1 guarantees that in our scheme, RSS
values and τ are IND-OCPA secure for all sensing periods and
membership changes. Hence, our scheme achieves Objectives
1 and 2 as required.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We now evaluate our proposed scheme, LP-3PSS, by com-
paring it to existent approaches that we briefly explain below.
A. Existing Approaches
PPSS [3] uses secret sharing and the Privacy Preserving
Aggregation (PPA) process proposed in [23] to hide the
content of specific sensing reports and uses dummy report
injections to cope with the DLP attack. LPOS [14] also uses
OPE but in a completely different way than how we use it in
this paper. Users OPE encrypt their RSS values, send them
to FC which, based on the order of the encrypted RSSs,
performs at worst a logarithmic number of yao’s millionaires
secure comparisons [24] between τ and RSSs and then makes
a final decision about spectrum availability. PDAFT [13]
combines Paillier cryptosystem [25] with Shamir’s secret shar-
ing [26], where a set of smart meters sense the consumption of
different households, encrypt their reports using Paillier, then
send them to a gateway. The gateway multiplies these reports
and forwards the result to the control center, which selects a
number of servers (among all servers) to cooperate in order to
decrypt the aggregated result. PDAFT requires a dedicated
gateway, just like LP-3PSS, to collect the encrypted data, and
a minimum number of working servers in the control center
to decrypt the aggregated result.
B. Performance Analysis and Comparison
We focus on communication and computational overheads.
We consider the overhead incurred during the sensing oper-
ations but not that related to system initialization (e.g. key
establishment), where most of the computation and commu-
nication is done offline. We model the membership change
events in the network as a random process R that takes on 0
and 1, and whose average is µ. R = 0 means that no change
occurred in the network and R = 1 means that some users
left/joined the sensing task. Let β(t) be a function that models
the average number of users that join the sensing at the current
sensing period t, where
β(t) =
{
n(t)− n(t− 1), if n(t)− n(t− 1) > 0 & R(t) = 1
0, otherwise
The execution times of the different primitives and proto-
cols were measured on a laptop running Ubuntu 14.10 with
8GB of RAM and a core M 1.3 GHz Intel processor, with
cryptographic libraries MIRACL [27], Crypto++ [28] and
Louismullie’s Ruby implementation of OPE [29].
Computational Overhead: Table I provides an analytical
computational overhead comparison including the details of
variables, parameters and the overhead of building blocks.
In LP-3PSS, FC requires only a small constant number
of (D, E ,OPE ) operations. An SU requires one OPE and
TABLE II: Communication overhead comparison
Scheme Communication
LP-3PSS (n + 1) · ǫE
LPOS 2γ · |p| · (2 + log n) + n · ǫOPE + µ · |Q| · log n
PPSS |p| · n + β · µ · |p| · n
PDAFT |N | · (2(n + 1) + β)
ǫOPE = 128 bits: maximum ciphertext size obtained under OPE encryption, ǫE :
size of ciphertext under E .
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Fig. 1: Performance compariosn, κ = 80, β = 5, µ = 20%
E encryptions of its RSS . Finally, GW requires one D oper-
ation per user and one E of vector b. All computations in LP-
3PSS rely on only symmetric cryptography, which makes it the
most computationally efficient scheme among all alternatives.
For illustration purpose, we plot in Fig. 1(a) the system
end-to-end computational overhead of the different schemes.
Fig. 1(a) shows that LP-3PSS is several order of magnitudes
faster than the other schemes including LPOS , that we pro-
posed in a previous work, for any number of users.
Communication Overhead: Table II provides the analytical
communication overhead comparison. LP-3PSS requires (n+1)
E ciphertexts and single ζ, which are significantly smaller than
the ciphertexts transmitted in the other schemes.
We further compare our scheme with its counterparts in
terms of communication overhead in Fig. 1(b). Fig. 1(b) shows
that LP-3PSS has the smallest communication overhead since,
again, it relies on symmetric cryptography only. PPSS and
PDAFT have a very high communication overhead due to the
use of expensive public key encryptions (e.g., Pailler [25]).
Overall, our performance analysis indicates that LP-3PSS is
significantly more efficient than all other counterpart schemes
in terms of computation and communication overhead, even
for increased values of the security parameters, but with the
cost of including an additional entity.
VI. CONCLUSION
We developed an efficient scheme for cooperative spectrum
sensing that protects the location privacy of SU s with a
low cryptographic overhead while guaranteeing an efficient
spectrum sensing. Our scheme is secure and robust against
users dynamism, failures, and user maliciousness. Our perfor-
mance analysis indicates that our scheme outperforms existing
alternatives in various metrics.
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